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How did the animal that we used to be develop into the creature that we now are? This
is the central question that Ian Stewart and Jack Cohen pose and address.
It is an ancient puzzle, and one that becomes, if anything, even more baﬄing as the
years roll by. We are considering it at a time when human evolution seems effectively
to have ceased, at least in a physical sense. Indeed, we may even be witnessing some
degree of deterioration as increases in the general standard of living and advances in
medicine combine to ensure that it is no longer just the fittest that survive and breed.
The puzzle is many-faceted. There is not just the how and why of our conscious self-
awareness. There is also the question of why the brain with which we are equipped
seems to be so extraordinarily over-designed, compared to what one imagines would have
been needed during our final stages of positive evolution as hunter-gatherers. What
conceivable advantage can it have been to our remote forbears, during this evolutionary
era, to possess brains able, in principle, to create and grapple with general relativity and
quantum mechanics? How can it possibly have helped them that their brains would have
been able, in principle, to appreciate the writings of Shakespeare or Bunin, or the late
Beethoven quartets? Why should a brain of this complexity and flexibility have evolved?
At first sight such a development would seem highly improbable, especially given the huge
physiological demands made by the human brain in terms of resources.
Although this is a long book, the answer offered by the authors can be stated succinctly.
It is that the human brain and human culture evolved together, through an interactive
process that they refer to as “complicity”.
The word culture is taken here in its widest sense, including language and everything
else that a new person needs to be taught, from babyhood onwards, in order to become
a full-blown human. Culture is an essential component of what the authors call a “make-
a-human kit”. Without it, you do not get a fully human being: children brought up by
animals, without contact with other humans to beyond the age of about 12, are then
incapable of learning to talk or to understand speech beyond the most rudimentary words
and phrases.
Ian Stewart is a mathematician and Jack Cohen is a biologist, and they write very
much from these two perspectives. They discuss reductionism at length and comment on
the limitations of this approach to science. In arguing that the whole is often more than
the sum of the parts, and in discussing emergent phenomena, they are on strong ground
and speak good sense. But the extreme form of reductionism that they set up in order
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to knock down is not one that would be recognized by many physicists. Consider, for
example, the following passage about the song of a great tit –
The muscle movements required to produce that simple note are more in-
tricately choreographed than Sleeping Beauty – every tiny muscle fibre must
contract at the right moment. A vast, unfathomable sea of molecules sloshes
around inside the bird’s body in unknown patterns to control those muscles.
Electrical pulses flash along its neural pathways...
The sound radiates outwards, conveyed by vibrations in the air. The air exists
because it condensed, along with everything else on the planet, from primeval
dustclouds surrounding a nascent star...
and so on, for a page or more. It seems that the authors’ idea of reductionism is that one
should be able to understand the tit’s “tweetle” in terms of events at the molecular level.
But that is not at all how a physicist would be likely to think about such a problem.
Physicists are of course innately reductionist, in the sense that they try to describe
observed phenomena in the simplest terms. To do so, they work at whatever is the
appropriate level. For example, particle physicists are concerned with the inner structure
of nucleons and sub-atomic particles; but a solid state physicist working mostly at the
atomic or molecular or band-structure level, never has to worry about the structure of
nucleons at all. Someone interested in celestial mechanics will be thinking of matter on an
even larger scale. Yet physicists are always aware that the systems they treat as entities
can (usually) be analysed at a deeper level although, in a given context, it may not be
helpful to do so because it adds nothing to understanding. They are also well aware that
reductionism tends to be unidirectional. Nobody would expect, for example, to be able
to infer the discipline of chemistry just starting from a knowledge of sub-atomic particles
– nor the possibility of a great tit from a knowledge of chemistry.
Naturally, in a book of this kind, the authors spend a fair amount of space on the
mind/body relationship and the nature of consciousness. Even if they do not move the
debate on very much further, what they have to say is interesting and perfectly reasonable.
For example –
If there is a core message to Figments, then this is it. Our minds lead a dual
existence. Descartes’ mistake was to view this as a duality of materials, which
it is not: it is a duality of interpretations, just as a map can be a sheet of
paper but represent a world. Features of the outside world are converted,
via our senses, into “figments” in our brains. On one level (brain) these are
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ordinary real-world processes involving chemicals, electrons, whatever; but
simultaneously on another level (mind) they are mental maps of a very different
order of reality, tigers and cows and people’s faces.
Of course, this insight is of no help in understanding why the real-world events in question
should give rise to the subjective phenomenon of mind. One may, of course, choose as an
act of faith to accept this interpretation of the origin of mind. Do animals have minds?
Those who work a lot with e.g. chimpanzees or dolphins seem confident that they do.
But the authors make an interesting cautionary comment. The very act of working with
these animals may in itself be creating minds where (little or) none existed before: the
creatures are “uplifted” by their close contact with humans. Thus a chimpanzee who has
been taught sign-language is in an important sense very different from a chimpanzee in
the wild. If the evolution of intelligence and mind are, as the authors suggest, universal
features of life wherever it is to be found, why is it only humans that have definitely
achieved this state on earth? One possibility, of course, is that we exterminated all
possible rivals, such as the Neanderthals – as so chillingly portrayed in Golding’s The
Inheritors.
This is a big book (324 pages, including the Index) that would, in my opinion, have
benefitted from a bit of pruning. The subjects addressed are important and quite fas-
cinating but the format, the whimsical style, and the (to me) over-exuberance of some
of the verbosity, make the book rather tiring to read and difficult to take seriously. The
problems with the format may not be entirely the authors’ responsibility (they are per-
haps not to be blamed for the footnotes being clumped in a ghetto at the end, rather
than being placed conveniently at the bottoms of pages). Yet they have chosen to include
dramatic interludes at intervals, mostly at the ends of chapters, that to my mind serve
little useful purpose. They are apparently intended to liberate the authors’ imagination
“by having a standard mechanism for indulging in wild unbridled speculation”. They
consist of conversations between imaginary, intelligent, yellow, ostrich-like creatures that
inhabit an imaginary planet called Zarathustra. Science fiction enthusiasts may possi-
bly enjoy these interludes, but the present reviewer quickly became bored and irritated
by the wasted space and consequent dilution of the main arguments and theme of the
book. Above all, Figments comes over as a collection of digressions and anecdotes. Most
are interesting, some are very funny, and there are only a few repetitions; but there are
too many of them and it all seems rather self-indulgent. Lengthy diatribes are included,
attacking people or organisations or procedures of which the authors disapprove. These
include, for example, drunken drivers, the law, the criminal justice system, government
officials, and the peer-review system for assessing research grant proposals. In some cases
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the authorial censure is clearly merited, and in others probably not – but, in any case,
many of the digressions are quite extraneous to the main thrust of the book, and a good
editor would have excised them. Redundant material of this kind is nonetheless mostly
good stuff, and could have formed the basis of several entertaining articles in popular
science journals, some science fiction short stories, and numerous trenchantly expressed
Letters to the Editor.
Figments deserves to be recommended to a wide readership. Some will be irritated by
its format and style but, if they soldier on, they will surely end up enriched by much of
what they find.
P.V.E. McClintock,
Lancaster University.
11 August 1998.
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